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PROPOSED REFORMS TO TEXAS JUDICIAL SELECTION:
PANELIST REMARKS
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK*
I am going to set the stage by providing a little background
about the various methods that States around the country use to
select their judges. I am also going to remind us of many of the
considerations that we like to think about when we are deciding
which of these methods is best. And I am going to push upon you
a new consideration that is sometimes not thought about in these
discussions as well as share some data regarding this last
consideration. But let’s start with some background about the
selection methods.
There are basically four different ways that States select their
judges around the country.1 The original method in all of the
States was political appointment.2 Almost all the States did the
same thing the federal government did from the beginning. And
while some of them did not have life tenure, all the States relied
either on the legislature, the executive, or both to pick their
judges.3 A handful of States still follow the political appointment
method today.4
In the early 1800s, States began to switch to partisan elections
and away from political appointment; by the time of the civil war,
the vast majority of States were using partisan elections to pick
their judges.5 And today there are still quite a few States that use
partisan elections to pick their judges.6 In the progressive era,
after deciding that politics was a bad thing, States developed the
idea of nonpartisan elections for judges—taking party
identification off the ballot.7 And a number of States today are
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of Selection: A Nationwide Study of the
Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1729–30 (2017).
2. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and
the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 856 (2012).
3. Id.
4. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Case for Political Appointment of Judges, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY, Apr. 2018, at 6 (highlighting that only four states select judges for their highest
courts with political appointments).
5. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 859-60.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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using non-partisan elections.8 It is close to the most popular
method today.
The only method that may be more popular today is the
commission method—the method that came about last in our
history.9 Sometimes it’s called “merit selection.” Other times it is
called the Missouri Plan because Missouri was the first state to
adopt the plan in 1940.10 This method basically asks a
commission to decide who is worthy to be placed on the bench.11
In practice, the commission will send a small number of names,
usually around three, to the governor, and the governor will pick
one of those names.12 The chosen candidate will then stay on the
bench until the term is up.13 Once the term is up, most of these
States will then use something called the retention election to
decide whether to retain the judge.14 It is an election with no
opponent. Rather, voters are asked yes or no: Do you want to
retain the judge?
Today, this commission-based system is used for high-court
judges in almost half of the States.15 It is the most popular method
implemented, followed by non-partisan elections, partisan
elections, and then political appointment. These are the four
methods that are still used around the country today.
In my experience, when considering which of these methods
should be adopted, people weigh various factors in their minds.
We want independent judges.16 We also want our judges to feel
somewhat accountable to the people or the political process for the
decisions they make; this restricts the judges from doing whatever
they want to. We of course want competent judges—people who
understand the law and write well. Furthermore, a lot of people
want racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the courts.17 Of course
people want honest judges—individuals of integrity. And we want
the judges to work in a system that people see as legitimate.18 These
8. Id.
9. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1729–30.
10. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 675, 678 (2009).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 678-79.
14. Id.
15. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1729–30.
16. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 846.
17. Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson, and Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial and Gender
Diversity on State Courts-An AJS Study, JUDGES’ J., at 28.
18. Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 705, 712–13
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are the typical factors that people seek out for people that
comprise our judicial system.
But there is another factor that is not often considered in these
discussions, but one that should be widely discussed. This factor
can be described as ideological skew: Are the courts filled with
judges with very different ideological views, very different values,
very different worldviews from the people who live in their States?
Now, someone may think to themselves, well, who cares if our
judges have different ideological views? Different ideological
views are not supposed to matter; a judge is supposed to follow
the law.
But there is a vast amount of empirical evidence suggesting that
a judge’s policy-views, world-views, and values make a difference
to how the judge decides a case.19 Not in every case, but in a lot of
cases. How a judge sees the law is often driven, especially when the
law is ambiguous, by a priori ideological views. And so if a State’s
judicial system is comprised of judges with very different views
than the people in their States, a State will have legal
interpretations that are very different than what the people want
them to be.
Now, why should a State be concerned about this ideological
skew? Well, a graph of the ideological views of the legal
profession in the United States of America demonstrates why
states should be concerned. This graph comes from a paper by
Adam Bonica and Maya Sen.20 In Figure 1 here, each bar on the
graph represents a certain number of lawyers. The liberal lawyers
are on the left side of the graph, and the conservative lawyers are
on the right side. And the little dotted line there is your average
lawyer—it will not be surprising that most lawyers will tend to be
more liberal.

(1994); see generally Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, Performing Impartiality: Judicial
Demeanor and Legitimacy, 35 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 137, 138–39 (2010).
19. Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 687-88.
20. Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. of Legal Analysis 277
(2016).
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Figure 1

Ideological Distribution of Lawyers

Source: Bonica et al. (2016)

So what does this mean? Well, it means a couple things.
Number one, if you have a selection method that relies on the
legal profession to pick judges, there will be a good chance that
the legal profession is going to pick judges with an ideological
distribution very similar to the dotted line—i.e., left leaning.
And of the four methods previously discussed, the commission
method, tends to place a lot of power to pick judges in the hands
of the legal profession. Why? Well, it is because the
commissioners on the commission are often picked by the state
bar.21 In some states, the state bar leadership will appoint
individuals to those commissions.22 In other states, the lawyers in
the state will vote for who should be on the commissions.23 But
when a majority of the commissioners are selected by the state
bar, a lot of power is handed to the legal profession. Thus, there
is concern that the commissions might select judges who are
ideologically similar to them instead of ideologically similar to the
people of the states.24
21.
22.
23.
24.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 679.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 689-90
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But even without the commission, because the pool of judges
will be drawn from the pool of lawyers, if states do not pay
attention to ideological preferences, the chances are that a
randomly picked judge out of the pool of lawyers will tend to be
more representative of lawyers rather than the people of the
State. Thus, if States do not screen the worldview of the potential
judges, a State will replicate the current distribution of the
lawyers. And this is not merely a theory anymore: I’ve spent
several years trying to prove that selection methods that do not
screen for ideology produce judges that are to the left of the
people in their States.
In particular, I have collected campaign contribution data for
all of the people who have served as appellate judges in each state
between 1990 and 2010—a total of more than 3000 different
appellate judges. I looked to see whether those appellate judges
donated more money to Democrats or Republicans over the
course of their lives—regardless of whether it was before they were
on the bench or after they were on the bench. And then I
compared the distribution of the political preferences of the
judges in each state to the people in that state. Were the people
voting more for Democrats or more for Republicans in state races
and federal races?
My results are in Figure 2. The middle line on this chart—the
0% line—reflects when judges and the people are the same, the
same distribution of Democrats and Republicans. Bars to the left
are states where the judges are more liberal than the people. Bars
to the right are states where judges are more conservative than
the people.

FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

312

6/5/2020 3:52 PM

Vol. 24

Texas Review of Law & Politics

More liberal

Source: Fitzpatrick (2017)

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%
New Hampshire
Iowa
Vermont
Georgia
Utah
Delaware
Ma ryland
Kentucky
New Mexico
Idaho
Alaska
Oklahoma
Arkansas > 2000
Nevada
Louisiana
Mo ntana
Wa shington
Nebraska
Kansas
North Carolina
North Dakota
Tennessee
Misso uri
Mississippi ≤ 1994
Hawaii
We st Virginia
Arkansas ≤ 2000
South Carolina
Oregon
Illinois
Rhode Island
Wisco nsin
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Connecticut
Min nesota
Colorado
Arizona
Indiana
Ma ine
Wyomin g
Florida
California
Michigan
Alabama
Ohio
New York
Mississip pi > 1994
Ma ssachusetts
Texas
South Dakota
Virginia

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

More conservative

Ideological Distribution of Judges

Figure 2
-60%

A couple of things to note. First of all, in the vast majority of
states, the judges are more left leaning than the people. And
again, it’s not surprising because lawyers are left-leaning. And if
we don’t pay attention to that, we end up with judges who are left
leaning. Very few states have judges who are right leaning, but I
will tell you one of those states is Texas. On the graph, the third
state from the bottom is Texas, and is one of the very few states
where the judges have been more conservative than the people.
We can also group this data by selection method rather than
by state. I do that in Figure 3. Here, we can test whether
selection methods that either rely on the legal profession to pick
judges or on non-partisan elections with no ideological
screening produce a left leaning skew. Figure 3 confirms the
presence of a skew. The top bar is the commission method; the
second bar non-partisan elections; the third bar is partisan
elections; and the fourth bar is political appointment. As
discussed, the 0% line depicts judges perfectly aligned with the
public’s ideological views. According to the graph, the Missouri
Plan and non-partisan elections have the biggest skew—and a
leftward skew—away from the public. The system that is the
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closest to the public is political appointment. Partisan elections
fall in between the two extremes.
Figure 3
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It should be noted that I did not test any of this data for
statistical significance. But Adam Bonica and Maya Sen have tested
similar data and they found the differences between selection
methods to be statistically significant.25 In my view, we therefore
ignore this data at our own peril.

25. See generally Adam Bonica and Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the
Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology Into Judicial Selection, 60
J.L. & ECON. 559 (2017).

